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duce more criminals. By sterilizing the mentally deficient we are
checking crime at its source. We are not permitting children to be
born in an environment entirely unsuited for the development of a
normal personality. It is not, however, to be inferred that depriving
the mentally deficient persons of parenthood will herald the end of
crime, but it will be a huge step toward the prevention of crime, the
clearance of our slums, and the betterment of society.
It is submitted that the mentally deficient should be permitted to
marry, to remain as functioning members of society, to be free indi-
viduals and not prisoners in an institution, but only after they have
been sterilized.
JAY F. AR No.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-IN THE USE OF FIREARMS AND
AUTOMOBILES
Any negligence, whether civil or criminal, is based upon the viola-
tion of some duty. As a crime is an offense against the state, criminal
negligence is imposed for the violation of some duty owed to the state
1
This duty may be violated in the negligent commission of an act,
2 or
in the negligent omission of an act.3 It is elementary to say that the
state is interested in the preservation of the lives of its members and
that each individual owes it a duty so to limit and control his conduct
as not to cause the death or great bodily harm of another.' This duty
may arise in various ways. It may be voluntarily assumed.
We have learned from experience that firearms are dangerous to
life. One who takes upon himself the responsibility of using firearms
assumes voluntarily, a duty not to injure others.0 While automobiles
are not considered dangerous instrumentalities, they are yet the
2 Healey and Bronner, supra note 21, at 216. "That unless the
stream of delinquency is checked at or near its source, its progressive
flow represents a cost to society, vast in its negative and positive
aspects, in non-contribution to society by the offender as well as the
actual outlay for his arrests, trials, attempted reformation, and safe
keeping." Sutherland, supra note 9, at 618. "The logical policy in
regard to crime is the policy of prevention. Punishment is at best,
a method of defense; prevention is a method of offense. It is evi-
dently futile to continue to take the individuals out of the situation
in which they become criminals, punish them, and permit the situa-
tion to remain in other respects as they were. A case of delinquency is
more than a physiological act of an individual; it involves a whole
network of social relations, and if we deal with that whole set of social
relations we shall be working to prevent crime.
A Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 65.
2 Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. Rep. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
3 State v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. Law 169 (1867).
Stephens, Digest Criminal Law (1877) 158.
Miller, op cit., supra note 1.
SSaye v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. Rep. 569, 99 S. W. 551 (1907).
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cause of an increasing number of casualties. The condition created
by the use of high powered motor vehicles upon the public high-
ways is most conducive to death if proper care is not used. For this
reason one who assumes the task of operating a motor vehicle upon a
public road assumes voluntarily a duty to operate it so as not to
cause injury to another.' It is the relationship existing between
society and the individual assuming the use of a firearm or an auto-
mobile that is the foundation of this duty. The standard whereby it
may be determined when this duty is violated is most conflicting.
8
In the case of State v. Hardie the defendant took a loaded pistol
that had been discarded for several years and, having reason to be-
lieve that it was useless and, intending to frighten deceased as a joke,
discharged the instrument causing death. The court ruled that the
degree of care required of one handling a dangerous and deadly
weapon is not the highest degree of care and prudence, but only such
care as a reasonable and prudent man would exercise under the
circumstances. The jury returned a verdict of manslaughter.
And in Nail v. State"
M the defendant drove her car on a straight
road at a speed of about forty miles an hour and struck deceased and
his car which was parked about eighteen inches over on the pave-
ment on the right side of the road. A statute authorized a conviction
for manslaughter if the homicide was due to culpable negligence. The
court ruled that culpable negligence was the want of ordinary care
ordinarily exercised under the circumstances and a verdict of man-
slaughter was entered. The court also stated that there was no dis-
tinction between negligence and culpable or gross negligence, but only
a difference of degree.
While the majority of courts make a distinction between negli-
gence and gross negligence and refuse to apply the ordinary tort stand-
ard of care, and require such varying terms as gross negligence,
culpable negligence, or reckless disregard," the minority rule as applied
in the above cases seems to state the sounder view.
The Intent which, is always an essential element of crime is im-
plied from the negligence."2 Criminal negligence at best is only a sub-
stitute for the intentP and is therefore purely fictional. As a practical
matter an actual intent cannot be required in all cases because of the
numerous homicides due to the careless and reckless conduct of per
sons who did not actually intend to harm anyone. In order to deter
future similar conduct and thus protect the interests of the state, we
have the invocation of this fictional doctrine. Since it is at best only
fictional in the beginning there is no logical reason for saying that it
7 Lauterbauch v. State, 132 Tenn. 603, 179 S. W. 130 (1915)
8 Note (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 933.
'47 Iowa 647 (1878).
20 33 Okl. Cr. 100, 242 P. 270 (1925).
1, Supra note 3.
'Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 667 (1892).
"3Note (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 637.
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
cannot be inferred from negligent acts as well as from what many
courts call "gross negligence". In any event the criminal intent need
not be alleged or proved where the death was the result of a known
duty. '
The state is not so much interested in the punishment of indi-
viduals after lives have been taken as it is in the preservation of
those lives. Prevention is the basic aim. Theoretically, then, punish-
ment is inflicted for its deterrent effect. Would the result be to deter
future similar occurrences if, in the use of a pistol or automobile, a
person is held criminally liable for a failure to exercise that care
which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily exercise under
the circumstances? While there is opinion to the contrary,6 it would
seem that if any credence is to be put in the theory at all, such punish-
ment would necessarily have a large deterrent effect. Should persons
assuming such a duty to the state be deterred from being grossly negli-
gent by punishment, they should likewise be deterred from acting be-
yond the bounds of ordinary men under those particular circumstances.
In Pamplin v. State" the defendant policeman leaned out of his
moving car and shot at the tire of an automobile in an effort to stop
it and make an arrest for exceeding the speed limit. The shot killed
a bystander. The court ruled that "culpable negligence is the want
of ordinary care ordinarily exercised by persons under similar circum-
stances, but a person handling a deadly weapon will be required under
the law to use a higher degree of care and circumspection than if
using an instrument ordinarily harmless." There are in fact no de-
grees of care. There is no higher degree of care. There is no ordi-
nary care as such. It is all ordinary care under the circumstances."
If the jury are told that one handling a deadly weapon is required to
exercise extraordinary care or a higher degree of care, they may well
get the impression that a high and almost impossible degree Is re-
quired. Because of the nature of the deadly weapon, more vigilance
and precaution should be exercised, but this would naturally be ex-
pected of an ordinary man under that circumstance. What is ordinary
care in one situation may not be ordinary care in another. A rate of
speed may be excessive at night but not in the daytime, or it may
be excessive on a city street but not on an open country roadY Any
particular situation therefore requires that only ordinary care be
used.'
It is submitted that the case of Nail v. State was right in holding
that a line could not be drawn between negligence and criminal negli-
gence, and that the only difference between any form of negligence
14 State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257 (1876).
15Supra note 8.
18210 Okl. Cr. 136, 205 P. 521 (1922).
1Note (1928) 6 Can. Bar. Rev. 327.
Is State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535, 106 S. E. 669 (1921).
"State v. Murphy, 324 Mo. 183, 23 S. W. (2nd) 136 (1929); State
v. Horner, 266 Mo. 109, 180 S. W. 873 (1915).
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was a matter of degree. So long as the basis of criminal responsibility
Is predicated upon negligence it is immaterial whether the defendant
was engaged in a lawful or an unlawful act,2 or what the degree of
the homicide happened to be,
2 ' the only question being whether, under
that particular situation, the defendant's conduct measured up to that
of an ordinary man. It, therefore, seems erroneous to instruct that
simply because the defendant was using a dangerous weapon a higher
degree of care should be required, or on the other hand that criminal
liability cannot be imposed unless there is something in the nature of
gross negligence. In determining criminal responsibility based upon
violation of any duty owed to the state, the jury should be instructed
as to whether, under that particular situation, the defendant exercised
such care as an ordinary man would have exercised.
CnTErxI s TIGNOn.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD OF CARE NECESSARY
The defendant was indicted for manslaughter. The act of culpa-
bility as alleged In the information was that defendant feloniously and
recklessly, without regard to the lives or safety of others, placed a
loaded trap gun in such a position and manner on the inside of his
chili stand in Joplin, Missouri, as to cause said gun to be fired or
discharged by the movement or opening of a certain window in the
building. The court instructed the jury that culpable or criminal
negligence, within the meaning of the law, is the omission on the
part of a person to do some act under given circumstances which an
ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under like circum-
stances, or the doing of some act, under given circumstances, which
an ordinarily careful and prudent man under like circumstances
would not do, and by reason of which omission or action another per-
son is endangered in life or bodily safety. The supreme court of
the state of Missouri upheld the instructions of the lower court as
being correct.1
The court in the principal case adopted the standard of care laid
down by the majority of the courts in civil cases based on actions of
tort. It shall be the purpose of this paper to attempt to show that such
a standard of care should be followed by the courts in cases based on
criminal negligence. However, the court must keep in mind the fact
that in these cases they are dealing with Crime, and not mere civil
liability. Therefore, they should instruct the jury that the negligence
of the accused must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and
not by mere preponderance of the evidence, as is the general rule in
cases involving civil liability.
'Comm. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873).
Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 133, 118 So. 906 (1928).
State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817 (1924).
